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ral selection and sociobiology 
of Mathematics. Statistics. and Computing, Oxford Polytech­
& Odling-Smee (P&O) set themselves the task of 
the "older sciences" with sociobiology. They 
"monolithic theory" that natural selection has 
"'~I'V"~"~'~ for evolution and advise SOCiobiologists to 
this view in favour of their multiple-level theory. 
they hope, will make sociobiology more acceptable. 
P & 0 show a regretable lack of understanding of 
co!nc€~pts of natural selection and adaptation. The plain 
their solution is illusory. 
that "Fisher and others did not hold firmly to 
te view as to what unit or units are being selected" 
selection. This statement is not correct as far as 
is concerned, for he says (1958, p. 37) that "any group 
viduals selected as bearers of a particular gene, and 
the genes themselves, will have rates of increase 
differ from the average." In fact, the monolithic 
which P&O criticise is the theory of natural selection 
by Fisher (1930; 1958), though they attribute it to 
Say that the gene "is well able to supply adaptations 
aspects of the world which are relatively perma­
.•" A gene can do no such thing. The most it can do is 
a small selective advantage to its bearer in a particu­
This advantage ensures that, after a large 
lions, the organism will be well adapted to 
narr1{~IWH environment. P&O go on to say that the gene 
provide adaptations for those events which "last long 
to have an impact on the animal and that must be 
to, yet may change and change again.... " P&O fail 
that the adaptation made by natural selection is 
totality of the environment which must, by definition, 
the type of environment they mention. It is this 
leads them to develop their model of multiple­
evolution. 
s grasp of the meaning of "adaptation" is uncertain. 
(1930; 1958) explains it beautifully. Adaptation is a 
term. An organism is well adapted to its environment 
as investigators can envisage another environ­
it is less adapted. Thus, adaptation can be 
statistically. If 0 represents the complex environ­
an organsim and A its position, then any point within 
with its centre at 0 and passing through A 
adaptation. A point outside this hyper­
rf','w<,'<p,nt< a worse adaptation. The respective positions 
A can be interchanged. A change in environment 
is represented by a point outside the hypersphere with 
at A and passing through 0, may require readapta­
the environment only if it is sufficiently removed from 
assuming that the organism is well-adapted 
Vlf.ommc,nt. Minor changes in environment may need 
The flaw in the theory of evolution by natural 
which P&O detect and which they seek to remedy 
multiple-level theory, is imagined rather than real. 
P&O's conception of natural selection amusing. They 
even though cultural adaptive traits can be transmit­
,,,,,owe,,,,y, they still cannot escape ultimate evalua­
selection." Again, " ... natural selection is 
to the source of any adaptation," etc. It needs to 
clearly that natural selection means nothing more 
differential reproduction by different genotypes and 
affects only those traits which are transmitted geneti­
It cannot "evaluate" a nongenetic trait. P&O also 
to have been unable to distinguish sufficiently 
between cultural and genetic adaptation. My criticism of 
their position can best be explained by means of an example. 
Consider two males, A and B, both born at the turn of the 
century and now past their reproductive period. A was a 
professor at a well known university. His contributions to 
science are well known. His is, in fact, a household name. He 
felt he could not afford the time to marry and rear children. B 
has been out of prison as often as he has been in it. However, 
he found sufficient time to marry and his wife has reared ten 
children with some help from the state. Which of the two is 
better adapted? The answer depends on whether your interest 
lies in cultural or genetic adaptation. Genetically, B is better 
adapted, for it is his progeny who will inherit the earth. In this 
case, natural selection has evaluated the cultural adaptation 
by eliminating it. However, I suspect this is not the sort of 
evaluation P&O have in mind. 
What is sociobiology? I will use.a famous analogy; it is the 
assertion that in an elephant a gene has found a way of 
making a gene. Why should the gene make such a complex 
"survival machine"? Presumably because this is the only way 
it can survive. Yet many more survival machines (Le., species) 
are extinct than exist today. Maybe these survival machines 
provide a survival outfit for some genes. Such a restatement 
may also help to explain the conflict between species as well 
as tribal wars, but it is unlikely to be acceptable to most 
SOCiobiologists. " 
In primitive times, there was, perhaps, only one gene. All 
other genes are derived from it by mutations. It is far from 
certain that a simple duplication would have been less effi­
cientin spreading it than the invention of survival machines. I 
find it surprising that this powerful entity which, we are told, 
directed evolution towards survival machines has found no 
way to ward off deleterious mutations which destroy survival' 
machines indiscriminately. Consider sex: it was, presumably, 
evolved by the gene to produce bigger and better survival 
machines. Yet this is also the mechanism which eliminates 
many genes. Perhaps the gene is practicing eugenics by 
eliminating bad genes! 
What is the fate of an individual gene in a population? 
Fisher (1930; 1958) showed that it must become extinct 
sooner or later if it has no selective advantage. With some 
selective advantage it may become fixed in a population, but 
this does not insure immortality because species also become 
extinct. The future of a. single gene is hopeless indeed. I 
cannot see how, in the face of this certainty, one can construct 
a scientific hypothesis which assumes a gene's immortality. 
Natural selection is never irrelevant. If a species is not 
well-adapted to its environment, selection helps it to adapt 
better. For a well-adapted species, selection helps to maintain 
that adaptation. These two roles of natural selection differ. 
The former, but not the latter, has evolutionary consequences. 
However, natural selection has no relevance to a trait which is 
not genetically determined. I find ?1any claims of sociobi­
ology to be unacceptable and wilt remain sceptical until 
sociobiologists show, conclusively, that a complex behavioral 
trait is genetically determined: P&O's attempt to make it 
more acceptable indicates to me how good intentions, when 
based on half-understood concepts, lead one astray. 
Indeterminacy is inherent in an inadequate 
model of evolution, not in nature 
Douglas Wahlsten 
Department Of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, 
Canada N2L 3G 1 
Plotkin & Odling-Smee's (P&O's) critique of a "monolithic 
theory" of evolution espoused by prominent sociobiologists 
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Commentary / Plotkin & Odling-Smee: Multiple-level evolution and sociobiology 
draws attention to the roles of learning, culture, and society in 
evolution. Insofar as it opposes the simple-minded genetic 
determinism so prevalent in this field, it shows a positive 
trend of thought, although it is somewhat surprising that the 
authors do not make reference to previous discussions of 
cultural transmission by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1978) 
or by Rao et at (1976). However, P&O's paper has several 
shortcomings which make the alternative model they propose 
untenable. 
Determinism and natural law. P&O advocate that the 
future course of evolution is "fundamentally unpredictable" 
because of the indeterminacy and randomness supposedly 
inherent in complex interactions within and between "levels" 
of their modeL They state boldly that "evolution is not a 
deterministic process." 
It is instructive to refer to the opening sentence of the fifth 
chapter of Darwin's Origin ,of Species where he states: "I 
have hitherto sometimes s~ken as if the variations- so 
common and multiform widi organic beings under domesti­
cation, and in a lesser degree with those under nature - were 
due to chance. This, of course, is a wholly incorrect expres­
sion, but it serves to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the 
cause of each particular variation." 
The problem with a' proclamation of randomness and 
unpredictability is that it may merely reify the theorist's own 
lack of knowledge and understanding, thereby discouraging 
further efforts to investigate and analyse phenomena. P&O 
are quite right in theit; opinion that living systems entail a 
plethora of exceedingly complex interactions that can never 
be understood by simplistic sociobiology, but I think they are 
wrong in their despair about prospects of understanding this 
web of interaetions. 
Furthermore, the present difficulty of predicting the 
future should not be made to weigh so heavily on only one 
aspect of the problem - the evolution of organic species. We 
cannot even predict what the inorganic environment will be 
like millenia from now, although the properties of this envi­
ronment, of course, depend to some extent on developments 
in the realm of life. At any rate, without an accurate estima­
tion of the conditions of life, it is impossible to predict the 
responses of living beings to changed conditions. 
The complexity of the system shows the need for a great 
deal more investigation of nature and of real interactions 
before we retire to the armchair and pass judgment on 
nature. 
Adaptation and natural selection. P & 0 assert that natural 
selection is "one of nature's universals," which evaluates 
"culturally derived adaptations in the same way as any other 
adaptation"; this implies that selection is the basis for all 
evolutionary progress. 
There is no doubt that there can be competitive struggle 
between cultures that may even lead to the extinction of 
certain features of a culture. However, adaptation or innova­
tion and cultural transmission can also take place without 
selection. Because of the rapidity of cultural transmission 
throughout a population within an individual's lifetime, and 
because cultural innovations come into being as solutions for 
widespread problems (e.g. disease) in nonrandom ways, it is 
possible for a new adaptation to be universally adopted in 
short order. This does not free a species from the reality of 
natural selection, but it does show that adaptation and selec­
tion are two separate and distinct sources of evolutionary 
change. Through cultural adaptation and transmission, 
progress is possible without the need for part of the popula­
tion to fail. The conditions of living for the whole of society 
can be elevated. 
The fundamental tautology. When P&O tell us that "one 
can never escape from natural selection," they seem to be 
using selection in its tautological sense: the most fit will 
propagate best; those that propagate best shall be called the 
most fit Darwin rose above this mundane level by 
that natural selection, which was obvious to almost 
was in fact a creative force, which could lead to the 
ment of a new species - something qualitatively 
from its ancestors. 
P&O do not inform us about the fundamental 
evolution: speciation. In some places they try to 
why a species is well-adapted to the conditions of 
and now, and why certain historical changes may 
within a species. But on a central problem of 
theory today, the gradual or abrupt transition to a 
species, their model is silent. 
P&O's speculations about genetic determination of 
Lng ability and the "capacity for culture" are topics of 
debate relating to attributes of human races and social 
and in the present target article these are topics 
simple terms that could easily be misunderstood 
The gens-learning dichotomy. Like so many 
field (e.g., Lorenz) P&O adhere to the dogma that 
only two means of information acquisition and translmil!Si(] 
genes and learning. This reveals a rather narrow pefS}:1CC1 
on heredity. Consider just three of the many 
nisms: Cytoplasmic inheritance (Grun 1976) involves 
mission of nonnuclear organelles and structural details 
mitochondria, endoplasmic reticulum, Golgi apparatus, 
membrane, etc. Certain of these contain their own D 
many do not. The key thing here is that cytoplasmic 
tures are not organized de novo by gene products acting 
disorganized pool of central intermediates. On the 
new structures are built using existing structures as 
(Lehninger 1967). The fertilized egg contains a diverse 
of structures in a well-organized cytoplasm,and 
non genetic components of heredity are reproduced and 
milted from old cells to new. 
The position of a structure in the cell can be rr3lnSml'((e< 
new cells. This is clearly evident in protozoa, where 
gical modifications of the cilia in the cell surface are 
ated for many generations. The importance of 
tional information" is now being recognized in LW"Hl""'llU 
organisms as well (see Subtelny & Konigsberg 1979). 
Corballis & Morgan: "The Biological Basis of Human 
ality" BBS 2(2) 1978.] 
. In mammals, inheritance may also entail transmission 
viruses, antibodies or various chemicals directly from 
to offspring via placental transfer or the milk; even 
sion of an acquired immunity via the father has been 
(Steele 1979). 
Thus P&O'sassertion that animals "cannot transmit 
their noncultural adaptations nongeneticalIy" is simply 
valid. This omission is especially serious because nong,en,el 
mechanisms of inheritance appear to be more 
chromosomal DNA-based mechanisms; they are 
Lamarckian in some instances. 
Culture In a nutshell. P&O argue the interesting point 
natural selection makes no distinction "between a . 
and a noncultural adaptation within the same animal"; this 
similar to saying that selection acts on phenotypes, not 
types. This notion raises a very big question about 
meaning of culture. The authors consider culture to 
founded upon associative learning ability, but this 
leaves out a host of non genetic, nonlearning aspects 
that appear to function almost the same way that 
narrowly defined, does. 
Consider an oak tree laden with acorns. The fact that 
tree has reached reproductive maturity proves that its 
ronment nurtures that particular species of oak. By 
its acorns onto fertile ground, the parent transmits one 
of its environment to its offspring. And what about 
nutrient-rich endosperm and the seed coat of the nut 
They are separate from the embryo proper, yet they 
Response/Plotkin & Odling-Smee: Multiple-level evolution and sociobiology 
from parent to offspring. 
nuclear genes and associative learning there is a 
....1'.'" u>tUll of phenomena in plants and animals alike, and 
such as the one diagrammed in P&O's Figure 2, 
totally neglects these is not a valid reflection of nature 
rather, a product of imagination inspired by narrowly 
Ullllscrlbf'<1 facts about nature. Having left so much out of 
'''''~'J'"'-' itls no wonder that P&O cannot even begin to 
accurate predictions about the future course of evolu­
se of monolithic sociobiology and 
mysticism 
of Ecology ang Evolution, Stale University of New York, Stony 
11794 
& Odling-Smee(P&O) give a nicely reasoned account 
natural selection, by adjusting gene frequencies 
acts on phenotypes, has its lasting effects. Selection is 
between organisms, never within, and it is always on 
mpltypes transcribed from genotypes, with no possibility of 
Il1lJlni~:ation from phenotype to gene. However complex 
of P&O's levels 2 and [3 might be, these levels have 
significance only to the extent that they affect 
,,_trPIH,,>n/'" arrays of level 1. I am a bit surprised at 
SOCiobiologists, radical or otherwise, 
'anything controversial in recognizing that evolu­
provide organisms " ... with some capacity for 
information gain and storage." Organs that 
use information are no less biological than those 
and use food. I suspect that the distinction 
levels 2 and [3 is a bit arbitrary, and that more levels 
recognized, but this would not affect their reason­
validity of the monolithic theory for phenotypic 
t these levels. 
nothing arbitrary about level 4. P&O show 
that there is a novel process here and that level 4 
special attention not needed at lower levels. 
process is cultural inheritance, which may be 
Lamarckian only in the special sense that inher­
te.\ltures are not coded in the genes, rather than in the 
that phenotypic features are being transcribed 
germ plasm. I can find no fault with the statement of 
necessary for cultural inheritance. Also, I accept 
comparisons between level-1 and level-4 modes 
" ..if·~n,,~ but I believe that P&O are led astray by a 
annr.~i,~tp some of the similarities. 
traits, memes as Dawkins's (1976) cited book 
are subject to natural selection - not because they 
fitness of organisms but because they are replica­
genes) and have a mechanism of inheritance. The 
ltS~lt~tion of memes is subject to the same rules and 
as the natural selection of genes. A gene may be 
selected without having developmental effects (by 
distortion, and other processes) or in spite of 
be considered unfortunate effects. Sexual compe­
example, may select for genes that reduce both 
viability and efficiency of resource ntilization by 
Likewise, cultural traits may be favorably selected 
consequences for biological fitness, 
well-being, or group survival. Astrology, celibate 
potlatch ceremonies, and the chewing of bubble 
a few examples. 
cultural fe-ature to prevail, it is necessary and suffi­
it to be effective at replicating itself in the environ­
by SOCiety. It is not necessary that it be 
adaptive for that society or any of its members. Note that 
P&O speak of cultural adaptive traits but nowhere recognize 
that cultural evolution can favor traits that are biologically 
maladaptive. They themselves clearly state the reason for this: 
the nongenetic mode of inheritance of cultural traits makes 
them partly independent of the fitness of their carriers. There 
may be societies in which Russian roulette would spread more 
readily than sound dietary innovations. P&O fail to recognize 
that the theory of evolution by natural selection is applicable 
wherever replicators arise, and that biological evolution based 
on those replicators called genes is merely a special case of the 
more general theory. The flaw in monolithic evolution, as 
they describe it, is that it is not monolithic enough. 
I fail to understand P&O's rejection of purpose at the level 
of the gene. The prevailing allele at a given locus owes its 
prevalence to an adaptive molecular structure. That structure 
is one of an astronomical number of possibilities, and it must 
be one of the best among all that have ever arisen at that 
locus, at getting itself replicated. This high level of functional 
effectiveness is the same sort of consideration that P&O use to 
argue that pink feet can have a teleonomic purpose. In fact, 
the argument is more reasonable for genes than for developed 
characters. All extant pink feet will soon be gone, but a gene 
with a role in the development of pink feet can grow ever 
more numerous througli evolutionary time. Natural selection 
reliably maximizes properties like adaptation, and fitness, and 
selfishness only at the level of the replica tors themselves 
(genes and memes). Such properties emerge at phenotypic 
and societal levels only with qualifications. The genetic 
mysticism that P&O condemn is preferable to the phenotypic 
mysticism that they condone. 
Any comprehensive theory has limitations, and it is possible 
to identify a limitation and label it a flaw. Sociobiology is an 
attempt to explain social behaviors as adaptations to the 
environment, especially the social environment. It does not 
address questions of behavioral ontogeny except in the 
limited sense of recognizing that ontogenetic mechanisms, 
such as learning capacities, are developed characters that 
must have ultimate evolutionary explanations. P&O are right 
that the monolithic theory is of little help in establishing links 
among genes, development, learning and socioculture. Their 
quotation from Rosenblatt (1976) is also valid; we need a 
convincing way of relating these different levels of behavioral 
organization, and this need is not met by sociobiology. My 
guess is that their multilevel theory is a bit too abstract a level 
to constitute an effective beginning for a theory of behavioral 
ontogeny. If and when we gel a detailed scientific picture of 
the development of social behavior in human and other 
cultural animals, I would expect sociobiology to have a role in 
explaining phylogenetic variation in the details of that 
picture. 
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model of evolution 
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Many of the commentaries cohere around two major 
points of criticism, The first is that we have omitted 
discussion of the mechanisms that are assumed to 
operate at levels 2, 3, and 4. Campbell, Cloak, Dews-
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